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Amgen Inc. v. United States International Trade
Commission: The Living Cell-Product
or Process?
The patenting of life forms and the interrelated conundrum,
whether a living thing is a product or a process, have been the sub-
ject of struggle in the courts and Congress for over a century.'
Amgen Inc. v. United States International Trade Commission 2 illustrates the
problems inherent in attempting to apply outmoded legal and polit-
ical formulas to continually evolving scientific technologies.3
I One of the earliest patent cases on "products of nature" is Ex parte Latimer, 1889
Dec. Comm'r Pat. 123. In Latimer the applicant attempted to claim a patent on the cellular
tissues of a pine tree. The Commissioner ruled that tree fibers are not patentable:
"Otherwise it would be possible for an element or a principle to be secured by patent, and
the patentee would obtain the right, to the exclusion of all other men, of securing by his
new process . . . [that which] nature has produced and which nature has intended to be
equally for the use of all men." Id. at 125-26. See also, General Elec. v. De Forest, 28 F.2d
641 (3d Cir. 1928) (attempting to claim pure tungsten); American Fruit Growers, Inc. v.
Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1 (1931) (an orange covered by a protective coating of borax); Ex
parte Grayson, 51 U.S.P.Q. 413 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1941) (shrimp, deheaded and
deveined). SeegeneraUy 1 D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 1.02[7], at 1-32 to 1-51 (1991) (discussing
products of nature).
2 Amgen, Inc. v. United States International Trade Commission, 902 F.2d 1532
(Fed. Cir. 1990). While this case was being heard by the administrative law judge (ALJ)
and the International Trade Commission (ITC), Amgen filed a separate suit against Genet-
ics Institute, Inc. (GI) and Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. (a Japanese firm, licensed by
GI to produce its products in Japan) for domestic violations of its patent claims, alleging
that the defendants had "infringed the [Amgen] patent by the production of recombinant
EPO . .. and by the use of transformed mammalian host cells containing transforming
vectors having recombinant DNA coding for the production of recombinant human EPO
at its facilities in the District of Massachusetts." Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical
Co., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1739 (D. Mass. 1989). This action against GI and
Chugai, as stated by the district court, "is about the highly competitive race between two
leading biotechnology companies, among others, to clone the gene for the human hor-
mone erythropoietin ("EPO")." Id. at 1738. The district court found that the Amgen
patent was valid and had been infringed. Id. at 1739. At the time of Amgen's action
before the ITC, "the race" was over within the United States; Amgen had been awarded
the domestic patent on recombinant erythiopoitin (rEPO). However, Genetics Institute
(GI) and Chugai had effectively nullified Amgen's victory by simply moving the patented
products overseas.
3 This case is based on questions arising out of recombinant DNA technology. Liv-
ing cells carry genetic information in specific deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) molecules.
DNA controls and determines all of the things that a cell does and produces. When cells
replicate, the new cells contain a copy of the parent cell's DNA. Current technology allows
scientists to introduce DNA into a host cell and have this cell express the new DNA as if it
were part of the cell's original DNA. This process is called DNA transfection. DNA mole-
cules are long linear polymers built from four different nucleotide building blocks, ar-
ranged in two complementary chains. During production of a protein (such as EPO) a
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Amgen 4 was able to obtain patents5 on the DNA sequences, vectors,
and host cells 6 used to produce recombinant erythropoietin (rEPO),7
specific sequence on the DNA helix is "copied" by ribonucleic acid (RNA) molecules. The
RNA is then "read" by codons (series of ribonucleic acid triplets). As each codon is read,
the corresponding amino acid is attached to a chain. This translation process is repeated
until the specific RNA chain has been replicated and the protein has been assembled.
DNA can be "cut" by laboratory processes at specific nucleotide sequences. By identifying
which sequence is responsible for instructing the cell on how to make a specific protein,
the technician can "cut out" the sequence and splice it on to a plasmid (a small DNA ring
capable of autonomous replication). Plasmids have the useful quality of being able to pass
from one cell to another, even between cells from different species. As the plasmid repli-
cates, the newly spliced DNA is also replicated (cloned). Recombinant DNA technology
includes this process of splicing DNA material from one cell into another cell for the pur-
pose of controlling the production of a specific protein, either for experimentation or for
commercially viable pharmaceutical production. For an in depth explanation of this pro-
cess, seeJ. WATSON, N. HOPKINS,J. ROBERTS,J. STErrz & A. WEINER, MOLECULAR BIOLOGY
OF THE GENE 65-94,208-09,211 (4th ed. 1987);J. WATSON &J. ToozE, THE DNA STORY: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF GENE CLONING xvi-xxiv (1981). For a detailed description of
the specific recombinant technology utilized by Amgen, see Certain Recombinant Erythro-
poietin, Inv. No. 337-TA-281, USITC Pub. 2186, at 94-109 (May 1989) (initial
determination).
4 Amgen Inc. ("Amgen") is a domestic corporation organized under the laws of the
State of Delaware and has its principal place of business in Thousand Oaks, California.
Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, USITC Pub. 2186, at 72. Amgen is involved in the
research and development of pharmaceutical products based on recombinant DNA tech-
nology. Id. Recombinant human erythropoietin, under the trade name Epogen, was the
first of these products which Amgen marketed in the United States. On February 21,
1991, the Food and Drug Administration approved Neupogen, Amgen's second drug de-
veloped through recombinant techniques. Neupogen, Amgen's name for granulocyte col-
ony-stimulating factor (G-CSF), stimulates the blood stem cells that produce white blood
cells.
5 Amgen is the owner of U.S. Pat. No. 4,703,008 (the '008 patent). Id. at 74. Amgen
filed the application for a patent on December 13, 1983, in the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO). Id. A patent entitled "DNA Sequences Encoding Erythropoie-
tin" was issued on October 27, 1987. Id.
6 Among the specific items included in the '008 patent are: DNA sequences encod-
ing for human erythropoietin; plasmids or vectors including the EPO DNA sequence; and
host cells transfected with a DNA sequence. Id. at 21. Transfection refers to the introduc-
tion of foreign DNA into host cells, which then express it as if it were part of the cell's own
genetic apparatus. A vector or plasmid is the carrier which brings the foreign DNA into
the host cell and allows this DNA to replicate as the host cell replicates. A host cell is the
cell in which a gene, not normally present, has been inserted for the purpose of expressing
the protein coded in the inserted gene. See generally supra note 3.
7 Erythropoietin (from the Greek erythro meaning 'red' and poiein meaning 'to make')
is a glycoprotein produced in the kidney, and to a small extent in the liver, which acts like a
hormone, traveling from the kidney through the bloodstream to the sites where blood cells
are made (bone marrow and spleen), to stimulate blood stem cells to differentiate and thus
give rise to the formation of red blood cells. Under normal conditions the amount of red
blood cells (erythrocytes) circulating in adults remains relatively constant, even though
these cells are continually dying and being replaced. Scientists who observed this phe-
nomenon hypothesized that a negative feedback mechanism controlled the production of
red blood cells. In the early 1950s, the existence of this factor was directly identified and
named erythropoietin. In the body, erythropoietin is produced in response to the level of
erythrocytes in circulation. The level of erythropoietin rises and falls with the level of red
blood cells. Scientists speculate that this is a response to concentration of oxygen (red
blood cells carry oxygen from the lungs to the body's cells). Graber & Krantz, Erythropoie-
tin and the Control of Red Cell Production, 29 ANN. REV. MED. 51, 51, 54-55 (1978); E. GOLUB,
IMMUNOLOGY: A SYNTHESIS 157-78 (1987). Erythropoietin injections are used as a treat-
ment for patients suffering from anemia (low levels of red blood cells) caused by rheuma-
1991] PATENTS AND PRODUCTS OF NATURE
but failed to establish the claims directly relating to the "process"
involved.8 In spite of Amgen's patent, 9 a Japanese firm' 0 was able
simply to remove the patented cells from the United States to Japan,
replicate the process using the host cells in Japan, and then import
the finished product, recombinant erythropoietin, back into the
United States." 1
Amgen brought suit claiming violations of the Tariff Act of
1930.12 The International Trade Commission (ITC) and the Federal
toid arthritis, chronic infection, and some cancers. Graber, supra, at 59. Injections of
erythropoietin are also a significant therapeutic agent in the treatment of anemia caused by
kidney disease (since erythropoietin is produced in the kidneys, patients lacking kidneys or
with kidney disease do not produce sufficient erythropoietin). d. at 60. Thus, erythro-
poietin has the potential of becoming a widely used clinical treatment. However, as it is
naturally produced in amounts too small to harvest efficiently, it must be "manufactured"
by recombinant DNA techniques in order for sufficient supplies to be available for wide-
spread pharmaceutical use.
Recombinant erythropoietin (rEPO) refers to erythropoietin manufactured through
the use of cells altered by human intervention. DNA, containing specific gene sequences,
is isolated and removed from human cells and then "recombined" with the DNA of host
cells (in this case extracted from hamsters) by a laboratory process (DNA transfection).
The host cell then produces erythropoietin. For a detailed description of the recombinant
technology involved in Amgen's discovery, see Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin,
USITC Pub. 2186, at 94-109; Chugai, 13 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) at 1742-45.
Recombinant erythropoietin differs from "natural" erythropoietin in its carbohydrate
composition. More significantly, the host cell differs from the naturally occurring cell in
the quantity of rEPO produced. Testimony at the ALJ hearing indicated that a recombi-
nant host cell produces erythropoietin at a rate at least a million times greater than the
human kidney cell. Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, USITC Pub. 2186, at 123. Thus
the recombinant technology allows clinical use of the hormone which would not otherwise
be possible.
8 Claims which covered the process of growing cells in a culture medium and then
isolating and extracting the EPO produced by these cells were rejected by the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) examiner on the basis of 35 U.S.C. § 102 (which requires the
invention to be novel, i.e., not known, used, patented, or described in print by others)
because they recited nothing more or less than what happens each and every time a cell
grows and expresses a protein. Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, USITC Pub. 2186,
at 130. In response Amgen amended its application, dropping the rejected process claims.
In re Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1906, 1910 (Int'l Trade
Comm'n 1989).
9 The use of a patented product constitutes patent infringement if done in the
United States. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988). However, the grant of exclusive patent rights is
limited to the United States. See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
10 Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., a Japanese manufacturer of pharmaceutical
products, and Chugai U.S.A., Inc., a U.S. based subsidiary, (collectively referred to as
Chugai) import rEPO into the United States. Chugai obtained its recombinant EPO tech-
nology from Genetics Institute (GI), a U.S. corporation based in Massachusetts. Under the
agreements, GI collaborated with Chugai and transferred rEPO technology to Chugai.
Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, USITC Pub. 2186, at 74-75.
11 Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, USITC Pub. 2186, at 28.
12 The Tariff Act of 1930 created a tariff commission to investigate unfair acts by
foreign importers that injured domestic industries. Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930
provides for relief against unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importa-
tion of articles into the United States. Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590, 703 (1930). How-
ever, as the courts subsequently interpreted section 337, it proved to be insufficiently
broad to completely protect United States industries. In re Amtorg Trading Corp., 75 F.2d
826 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 576 (1935). Amtorg held that the importation of a
product made abroad by a patented process did not constitute an unfair trade practice. In
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Circuit both found no violation of the Tariff Act, as in their opinions
only the product was patented, not the process.13 The Federal Cir-
cuit stated that the issue was a narrow one-whether or not the
Trade Act was intended to prohibit importation of non-patented arti-
cles made abroad by a process which in itself was not patented, but
which utilized patented products, or if protection is limited to impor-
tation of products made by expressly patented processes.' 4 How-
ever, the effect of its ruling is much more extensive. By following
outmoded formulas, the patent office and the court left Amgen, and
similar biotechnology companies, with adequate patent protection
within the United States, but completely defenseless against compe-
response to this decision, Congress expanded patent protection by enacting 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337a which stated that the importation, sale, or use of a product produced outside the
United States using a process covered by the claims of a United States process did consti-
tute an unfair act for the purposes of section 337. Pub. L. No. 76-710, 54 Stat. 724 (1940).
For a review of the history of section 337, see Clark, The Future of Patent-Based Investigations
Under Section 337 After The Omnibus Trade And Competitivness Act Of 1988, 38 AM. U.L. REV.
1149, 1153-59 (1989).
Amgen's complaint was pending when Congress passed, on August 23, 1988, the
1988 Trade Act, which amended sections 1337 and 1337a of the former act. Pub. L. No.
100-418, 102 Stat. 1215 (1988). The Trade Act stated that the amended section would
apply to all pending Commission investigations. Therefore, Amgen's complaint became
one under section 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii), which reads:
(a) Unlawful activities; covered industries; definitions
(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the following are unlawful, and when
found by the Commission to exist shall be dealt with, in addition to any other
provision of law, as provided in this section: ...
(B) The importation into the United States, the sale for importation, or
the sale within the United States after importation by the owner, importer, or
consignee, of articles that- ...
ii) are made, produced, processed, or mined under, or by means of, a
process covered by the claims of a valid and enforceable United States
patent.
19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1988).
13 In re Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, 10 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1906, 1910-11
(Int'l Trade Comm'n 1989); Amgen Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 902 F.2d
1532, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
14 Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1538. Patent law distinguishes between product and process
patents. Product patents are upon invented or discovered articles; process patents cover
the method of making an article. Amgen originally submitted both product and process
claims, but the final patent lacked specific process claims, because the patent office re-
jected the original process claims and Amgen did not reapply for the rejected items.
Amgen's valid patents were on the "products" used in the process, such as DNA, vectors,
and host cells.
The final product, erythropoietin, was not patented because it falls into the unpatent-
able category of products of nature. A product of nature cannot be patented because it is
not "new" under the definition of patentable subject matter: "any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Even though Amgen's techniques facilitate an unnatu-
rally rapid production of erythropoietin, EPO is produced naturally in the body. Thus the
"product" that Chugai imported, EPO, was not and cannot be directly protected by a U.S.
patent. However, Chugai did use patented products in order to produce the EPO. Chugai
could not have "used" these products within the United States, without violating patent
laws, but is free to use U.S. patented products overseas. This situation does not occur in
the majority of patent cases because the typical invention involves processes which are
patentable and thus can be protected by 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
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tition mounted from a foreign base. This Note examines the deci-
sion of the Federal Circuit, the development of patent law
concerning "products of nature," and the ramifications of a biotech-
nology company's inability to protect its research investment from
overseas production and subsequent importation into the United
States.
Statement of the Case
Amgen Inc., brought a complaint with the International Trade
Commission (ITC)'5 alleging that importers had violated former sec-
tion 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 by importing recombinant erythro-
poietin (rEPO) made by a process 16  covered by a patent.
Respondents admitted' 7 that they used the host cells which are
within the claims of Amgen's patent (the '008 patent) in the manu-
facture of recombinant DNA abroad, but asserted that the use of a
patented product abroad does not constitute patent infringement
under 35 U.S.C § 271 because the grant of exclusive patent rights on
a product is limited to the territory of the United States.' 8 In the
15 Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, Inv. No. 337-TA-281, USITC Pub. 2186, at 2
(1989).
16 Amgen argued that, although it did not have a "process" claim labeled as such,
"the claims that did issue are 'hybrid' in that they cover both a product (the host cells) and
the intracellular processes that are inherent in the product (which synthesize EPO)." Id. at
23. The ALJ, ITC, and Federal Circuit all dismissed the possibility of a "hybrid" claim,
stating that according to patent law the claim must explicitly cover a process: "In addition
to the prosecution history, the testimony of the inventor, Dr. Lin, rebuts Amgen's argu-
ment that the claims of the '008 patent cover the host cell's intracellular processes for
making EPO. Dr. Lin was unable to indicate where the claims or specifications of his own
patent indicated that he was claiming the intracellular processes." Id. at 25. See also In re
Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, 10 U.S.P.Q,2d (BNA) at 1910; Amgen, 902 F.2d at
1537.
17 Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, USITC Pub. 2186, at 1. See also id. at 60 (the
ALJ's detailed explanation of this admission).
18 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) states: "Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever
without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States
during the term of the patent therefor, [directly] infringes the patent." The grant of exclu-
sive patent rights is limited to the United States. The Supreme Court addressed the ques-
tion of whether or not this section also applied to use of a patented machine abroad in
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972). In Deepsouth, Laitram Cor-
poration held a patent on shrimp deveining equipment. Deepsouth Packing Co. manufac-
tured similar deveining equipment and because of Laitram's patent could not sell this
equipment within the United States. To avoid the patent restrictions, Deepsouth exported
its machine abroad in parts (the individual parts were not patented). Once abroad, the
parts were assembled into the machine. The Court held that under § 271 "it is not an
infringement to make or use a patented product outside of the United States." In order to
secure an injunction Laitram had to show "that Deepsouth 'makes,' 'uses,' or 'sells' the
patented product within the bounds of this country." Id. at 527. The Court held that a
patent only protects the operable assembly of the invention and not the manufacture of its
parts. Id. at 528. Congress reacted to this decision by adding a new subsection to section
271: "Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United
States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention, where such
components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively induce the
combination of such components outside of the United States in a manner that would
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initial determination, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that
the ITC had jurisdiction, but that the rEPO process was not pro-
tected under the Trade Act because Amgen's patent covered only
the product and not the process.' 9 The ITC agreed that Amgen's
patent did not cover the process. 20 However, the ITC further rea-
soned that because Amgen did not have a process patent, the com-
plaint was not covered by the scope of the Trade Act and, therefore,
the ITC lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The ITC dismissed
Amgen's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, taking no
position on the merits of the case.2' Amgen appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which found that:
(1) the Commission's order terminating the investigation for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction was appealable; (2) the Commission
should have decided the case on its merits; (3) the patent holders'
host cell claims were not unique "hybrid" claims; and (4) the Tariff
Act does not apply to a "process" utilizing products covered by a
United States patent. 22
The Federal Circuit first focused on the question ofjurisdiction.
The ITC had terminated Amgen's claim on the ground that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction because in its opinion the claimed process
infringement was not a violation under section 337 of the Tariff Act
of 1930.23 The court of appeals explained that authority to review a
infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as
an infringer." 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (1988).
Thus, the importation of a product manufactured abroad through the use of a process
which, if done within the United States, infringes a valid patent is an unfair act under the
Tariff Act. The export of unassembled parts of a patented product in order to avoid pat-
ent laws is also prohibited. However, Amgen patents do not fall into either of these cate-
gories. They failed to establish "process" claims and the end product, erythropoietin, is
not patentable.
19 Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, USITC Pub. 2186, at 20-21. The ALJ found
that the intent of 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (a)(l)(B)(ii) is to make relief available only when the
patent claims cover a process.
20 In re Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1906, 1910-11
(Int'l Trade Comm'n 1989).
21 Id. Commission Chairman Brunsdale and Vice Chairman Cass disagreed with the
majority's decision to dismiss the complaint without a finding on the merits. The dissent
construed the enabling statute to grant jurisdiction: "No conceivable basis exists for read-
ing that expansion of our authority [the enactment of Section 337a] as if it were intended
to contract the scope of ITCjurisdiction .... That, however, is the effect of the majority's
decision today." Id. at 1914.
22 Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1536, 1538, 1540.
23 The original Amgen patent application included claims which described the pro-
cess involved in growing the transfected cells in a culture medium and then isolating the
EPO from the medium (steps done by a technician, not the cell itself). Amgen dropped
those claims after the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) examiner rejected them as obvi-
ous in view of known processes that entail growing other types of host cells to produce
other proteins. Amgen then stated in its amendment that none of the rewritten claims
covered the process described in its dropped claims. The ITC found that, since the "pro-
cess" claims had been dropped, the '008 patent no longer described a process and was,
therefore, not covered by 19 U.S.C. § 1337a which specifically protects patented U.S.
processes from unfair importation. It concluded that "subject matter jurisdiction under
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decision of the ITC is limited by 19 U.S.C. § 133 7 (c), which limits
appeals to final determinations. 24 Both the ITC and Chugai filed
motions to dismiss the suit on the ground that no "final determina-
tion" had been entered. The Federal Circuit, however, agreed with
Amgen's reply that the Commission's April 10 order is "intrinsically
a final determination not to exclude articles from entry," and thus is
appealable. 25 The court noted that otherwise a commission could
effectively "shield all determinations from judicial review simply by
labelling the determination as a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. ' 26
This would be contrary to the statutory scheme by preventing judi-
cial review of negative determinations.2 7
The Federal Circuit explained that treating the case on the mer-
its is preferable because subject matter jurisdiction is commonly in-
cluded in the same statute as that which grants a federal right to the
complaining party. The court relied on the Supreme Court decision
in Bell v. Hood which held that "failure to state a proper cause of
action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for
want ofjurisdiction."28 The court found this precedent applicable to
subsection 337(a)(1)(B)(ii) may be invoked only when process patent claims exist." In re
Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, 10 U.S.P.Q02d (BNA) at 1911.
24 Section 1337(c) of the Trade Act states: "Any person adversely affected by a final
determination of the Commission under subsection (d), (e), (0, or (g) of [section 1337]
may appeal such determination... to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit .... " 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1988).
25 Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1535.
26 Id.
27 Id. In support of this holding, the court cited Block v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In Block, the Commission had itself terminated
an investigation after the patent forming the basis for the alleged section 1337 violation
was substantially changed and no findings had been entered. The court found that noth-
ing in the termination order prejudiced the parties in a future proceeding. Block, 777 F.2d
at 1571-72. In Amgen's case, the Federal Circuit distinguished Block, stating that the Com-
mission did make "one very important finding: that the claims of the '008 patent do not,
in fact, cover a process." Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1535. The court found that this finding
clearly reached the merits of Amgen's case and thus gave the court jurisdiction under
section 1337. Additionally, the court found that any future actions brought by Amgen
would be dismissed for the same reason. Id at 1536.
28 Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946). In Bell, petitioners brought suit in federal
district court to recover damages from FBI agents who had allegedly falsely imprisoned
the plaintiffs, illegally searched the plaintiff's premises, and illegally seized property be-
longing to the plaintiffs. The complaint alleged federal jurisdiction under the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments. After hearing motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, the dis-
trict judge dismissed, on his own motion, for want of federal jurisdiction because the ac-
tion did not arise under the Constitution. Id at 680. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari because of the importance of the jurisdictional issue involved and held that fail-
ure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits. "Whether the
complaint states a cause of action on which relief could be granted is a question of law and
just as issues of fact it must be decided after and not before the court has assumed jurisdic-
tion over the controversy." Id. at 682. The Federal Circuit also distinguished the two
exceptions to the above rule stated by Bell. The first exception is applicable where the
alleged claim is immaterial, brought solely to obtain jurisdiction. This was not the case in
Amgen. The second Bell exception involves claims which are "wholly insubstantial and friv-
olous," also not applicable to Amgen. Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1537. See also Jackson Transit
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the instant case because Amgen's complaint had stated on its face
"that Chugai was importing rEPO and that the rEPO was made by a
process covered by the '008 patent."' 29 The fact that Amgen could
not later obtain relief under this claim was not material, and, there-
fore, the court held that Amgen's case should not have been dis-
missed based on jurisdiction.30 Finding that the decision was
intrinsically determined on the merits, the court further held that it
had jurisdiction to review the Commission's order.3'
The Federal Circuit next addressed Amgen's assertion that its
product claims differ from standard product claims, because they
cover not only the named products, but also processes going on
within the products-i.e., not only the host cells, but also the process
of EPO production going on within the host cells.3 2 Analogizing the
microorganisms in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,33 the court stated that
host cells are a "composition of matter,"13 4 and although cells are
living "machines" in that they perform intracellular processes, this
does not make them any different from any other mechanical
machine.3 5 Following this reasoning, the court concluded: "A host
cell claim does not 'cover' intracellular processes any more or less
than a claim to a machine 'covers' the process performed by that
machine."13 6 Finding that Amgen's claims are thus "legally indistin-
guishable" from any other product claim, the court asserted that the
issue in this case was whether or not section 1337 was intended to
prohibit importation of an article made abroad by a process utilizing
Authority v. Local Division 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15, 21 (1982);
Do-Well Mach. Shop v. United States, 870 F.2d 637, 639-40 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
29 Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1536.
30 Id. In a footnote, the court distinguished cases presented by the Commission in
support of its rejection for lack ofjurisdiction. In Federal Trade Comm'n v. Raladam Co.,
283 U.S. 643 (1931), the complaint had been brought sua sponte by the commission and
could thus be distinguished from cases brought by private parties. Albert v. Kevex Corp.,
729 F.2d 757 (Fed. Cir. 1984) was distinguished on the basis that the jurisdictional finding
did not mesh with the finding on the merits.
31 Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1537.
32 ld at 1537-38. Amgen asserted that the claims at issue were hybrid in that they
covered not only the host cells but also "intracellular processes, inseparable from the cell,
that are utilized by the cell to manufacture EPO." Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin,
USITC Pub. 2186, at 13. See also infra notes 89-101 and accompanying text.
33 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (holding that living organisms are not per se unpatent-
able); See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
34 Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1537.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 1538. The court explained that the statutory interpretation issue in the
Amgen case involved the precise meaning of the word "cover" in section 1337(a)(l)(B)(ii):
"a process covered by the claims of a ... patent." Amgen asserted that its patent claims
naming the host cell also "covered" the process going on within the host cell. The Federal
Circuit disagreed, holding that the correct interpretation of "covered" should be the plain
meaning of the term among the patent lawyers to whom the statutes are directed. The
court concluded, therefore, that the correct interpretation is: "a patent 'covering' a pro-
cess is a patent containing at least one claim defining a process." Id.
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a product claimed in a U.S. patent, namely the host cell.3 7
Examining the relevant statutes, the Federal Circuit noted that
the key language in section 1337, "process covered by the claims,"
was not altered by the 1988 Trade Act, and, therefore, the legislative
history of the former section was pertinent.38 House and Senate re-
ports accompanying the original bill indicate that 1337a was directed
toward correcting a problem which arose after a federal circuit deci-
sion39 had held that importation of products made abroad using a
United States process patent did not constitute an unfair method of
competition.40 The Amgen court asserted that there was no indica-
tion in the legislative history4 ' that section 1337 was intended "to
prohibit the importation of goods made by a process which merely
used abroad a product, apparatus, or material patented in this coun-
try." 42 Amgen cited legislative history of the 1988 Trade Act to as-
37 Id.
38 Id. Pertinent extracts from this legislative history were compiled by the ALJ and
published with the determination in Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, USITC Pub.
2186, at appendix A. This summary of the legislative history indicates Representative Pe-
terson of Florida introduced a bill in 1973 whose stated purpose was "[t]o amend the
Tariff Act of 1930 to protect against unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the
importation and sale of certain articles and defining certain terms used in connection
therewith." d. at appendix A-1. This first attempt died in committee. After another
failed attempt, Rep. Peterson introduced an amended bill in 1940. The Senate Commit-
tee, reporting on this bill stated: "Since the Amtorg decision owners of American process
patent [sic] are helpless to prevent the infringement abroad of their patent rights. This bill
will give to them the same rights which the owners of product patents have." Id. at appen-
dix A-6 (quoting S. REP. No. 1903, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 4 (1940)). The final bill agreed to
by both the House and Senate (H.R. 8285) was approved by the President onJuly 2, 1940.
39 In re Amtorg Trading Corp., 75 F.2d 826 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 576
(1935), questioned whether the importation of a product made abroad by a patented pro-
cess constituted an unfair trade practice. The court reversed a prior decision, In re North-
ern Pigment Co., 71 F.2d 447 (C.C.P.A. 1934), and held that such importations do not
constitute an unfair trade practice. The Amtorg court held that relief under section 337 if
the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1337) related "solely" to the use abroad of a patented
process and was not meant to "broaden the field of substantive patent rights, and create
rights in process patents extending far beyond any point to which the courts have hereto-
fore gone in construing the patent statutes." Amtorg, 75 F.2d at 834. Because the patent
grant is limited to the United States, the Amtorg court held that use of a patented process
abroad and its subsequent importation does not constitute infringement. Id. at 831. In
response to this decision, Congress enacted H.R. 8285. See supra note 38. The bill was
codified as part of the Tariff Act of 1930, § 337, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1337: "The
importation for use, sale, or exchange of a product made, produced, processed, or mined
under or by means of a process covered by the claims of any unexpired valid United States
letters patent, shall have the same status for the purposes of section 1337 of this title as the
importation of any product or article covered by the claims of any unexpired valid United
States letters patent." 19 U.S.C. § 1337a (1940).
40 Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1538, 1539.
41 The court cited the following House Report: "This bill is designed to correct the
present problem which was created when the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in the
case In re Amtorg Trading Corporation reversed its former decision and held that the importa-
tion of products made abroad in accordance with a United States process patent without
consent of patentee was not regarded as an unfair method of competition." Id. (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 1781, 76th.Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1940)).
42 Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1539.
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sert that Congress did indeed intend to prohibit such practices, 43 but
the court disagreed with Amgen's interpretation, asserting that a
substantive change in its scope could not have been intended be-
cause one of the bill's sponsors twice stated that the amended sec-
tion 1337 is merely a reenactment of the former section. 44
The Federal Circuit then stated that it was its "impression" that
Chugai's utilization of the host cells in Japan to produce rEPO is
something that had not been considered by the Congress and there-
fore not discussed or dealt with in the Trade Act. 45 Amgen's allega-
tion that the problem is one of first impression and that the court was
faced with "a precedent-setting question of exceptional impor-
tance," further convinced the court that Congress had not given it a
thought. 46 The court concluded that if there is a need to alter the
understanding of the "process covered by the claims" language,
"which has persisted unchanged for nearly half a century," it is a task
not for the courts, but for Congress, "which can explore its impact
and side effects." 47
The Federal Circuit concluded that the complaint must be dis-
missed because none of the claims of Amgen's patent covered the
process performed overseas. 48 The Commission's April 10, 1989,
order, however, was vacated and remanded for entry of a final deter-
mination dismissing the complaint on the merits because the dismis-
sal should not have been for lack of jurisdiction.49
Background
Amgen's assigned patents on the host cell, DNA sequences, and
vectors stem from a line of cases which established that some catego-
ries of "products of nature" are eligible for patent protection.50 A
43 In support of its argument Amgen quoted the following statement made by Sena-
tor Lautenberg:
Section 337(a)(1) (a reenactment of section 337a) will provide the assistance
necessary for emerging U.S. industries, such as the biotechnology industry,
to compete in a marketplace without interference due to unfair acts of for-
eign competitors. The continued broad jurisdiction of the International
Trade Commission will help U.S. industry address the unfair activity of for-
eign competitors who, for example, import products manufactured using
patented genetic engineering technology. Merely moving manufacture off-
shore does not absolve the wrongdoer from the requirement to compete
fairly. This Trade Act protection prohibits the foreign enterprise from tak-
ingjobs from American workers by doing offshore that which they could not
lawfully do in the United States.
134 CONG. REC. S10711, 10713 (1988).
44 Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1539.





50 For a detailed review of the history of patenting "products of nature," see I D.
CnmsuM, PATENTs § 1.02[7], at 1-32 to 1-51 (1991). For specific information on the history
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United States patent gives the owner the exclusive right to make,
use, or sell the patented invention in the United States for seventeen
years. 5 ' In order to obtain a patent, the applicant must prove that
what he has invented is new. 52 The invention must also be nonobvi-
ous, 53 not already available or readily discoverable by using previ-
ously known techniques. These patent doctrines were first applied
to man-made products of nature in Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoc-
ulant Co.54 Funk addressed a patent application for an innoculant of
mixed bacteria used to infect leguminous plants, increasing the
plants' ability to fix nitrogen from the air.55 The Court stated that
patents cannot cover the function of the bacteria: "[T]hose qualities
are not patentable.... [Platents cannot issue for the discovery of the
phenomena of nature."'56 However, a patent could cover "the appli-
cation of the law of nature to a new and useful end."'57 Ten years
later, the Fourth Circuit expanded on the product of nature doctrine
in Merck v. Olin Mathieson Chemical.58 In that case, Merck & Co. ap-
plied for a patent on modified Vitamin B-12, which can be found
naturally in the rumen of cattle, but in minute quantities. The
Fourth Circuit found that the applicant had identified a previously
unidentified and unknown substance and thus the step from the nat-
ural product was one "from complete uselessness to great and per-
fected utility." 59 The principle formulated in the Merck decision was
applied in Amgen's suit for patent infringement. 60 The court re-
jected the argument that Amgen's claim covered a natural DNA se-
quence, but accepted it when construed as limited to the "purified
of patenting DNA sequences, see Eisenberg, Patenting the Human Genome, 39 EMORY L.J. 721
(1990). For a thorough bibliography of books and articles dealing with the subject of
genetic patents, see Bibliography: Genetics and the Law, 39 EMORY LJ. 875, 896-901 (1990).
51 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
52 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
53 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
54 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
55 Id. at 128-29.
56 Id. at 130.
57 The Court explained that the qualities of the bacteria are "like the heat of the sun,
electricity, or the qualities of metals ... part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men.
They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.
He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly
of it which the law recognizes." Id. In the case of the mixed bacteria in Funk Bros., the
Court stated that adding two strains together to make a more powerful innoculant was
"hardly more than an advance in the packaging of the innoculants. Each of the species of
root-nodule bacteria contained in the package infects the same group of leguminous
plants which it always infected." Id. at 131. The Court admitted that the combination
represented a commercial advantage in that the farmer no longer needed to buy different
packages for different crops, but this was not an adequate development to meet the patent
requirements: "[A] product must be more than new and useful to be patented; it must
also satisfy the requirements of invention or discovery." Id. at 131-32.
58 Merck v. Olin Mathieson Chemical, 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958).
59 Id. at 163
60 Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1759
(D. Mass. 1989).
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and isolated" DNA sequence. 6'
The landmark 1980 Supreme -Court decision Diamond v.
Chakrabarty held that a living genetically-engineered microorganism
is patentable subject matter under section 101.62 The Court empha-
sized that Chakrabarty's claim was not to a natural phenomenon,
"but to a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of
matter-a product of human ingenuity 'having a distinctive name,
character [and] use.' ",63 The Court concluded that the patentee's
bacterium was "markedly different" from any in nature: "His discov-
ery is not nature's handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patenta-
ble subject matter under § 101." 64
The Chakrabarty decision paved the way for Amgen's successful
host cell claims because under Chakrabarty the relevant inquiry is
whether the claimed invention is the result of human intervention.
Dr. Lin, 65 the Amgen scientist responsible for cloning the EPO gene,
spent more than two years in research trials attempting to isolate and
transfect the correct DNA sequence. 66 Although the carbohydrate
61 Amgen had argued that the invention it claimed was the DNA sequence encoding
human EPO. The court explained that, since that would be a nonpatentable natural phe-
nomenon, the claim was for "the 'purified and isolated' DNA sequence encoding erythro-
poietin." Id.
62 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980). Chakrabarty, a microbiologist
employed by General Electric, modified an existing bacterial strain by introducing new
DNA into the cell, giving the resulting organism the ability to break down crude oil. This
property, possessed by no naturally-occurring bacteria, had significant value 'for contain-
ing oil spills. The patent examiner allowed Chakrabarty's claims except for those on actual
bacteria, as under prior law living products of nature were not patentable. The Patent
Office Board affirmed, but the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed. The
Supreme Court upheld the patent, finding that while "laws of nature, physical phenomena,
and abstract ideas" are not patentable, Chakrabarty's claim was not to a "hitherto un-
known natural phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition
of matter," and thus the microorganism qualified as patentable subject matter. Id. at 309.
For a list ofjournal articles and notes analyzing the Chakrabarty decision, see 1 D. CHisUM,
PATENTs § 1.02[7], at 1-40 to 1-42 & n.24 (1991).
63 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 at 309-10 (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609,
615 (1887)). The Chakrabarty Court explained that earlier cases, which had denied patents
to products of nature, such as Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 123 (holding that
plants are natural products not subject to patent protection), were superseded by the Plant
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-64. In enacting this legislation Congress stated that the work
of plant breeders "in aid of nature" was a patentable invention. S. REP. No. 315, 71st
Cong., 2d Sess. 6-8 (1930); H.R. REP. No. 1129, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 7-9 (1930). The
Court stated that Congress had "thus recognized that the relevant distinction was not be-
tween living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not,
and human-made invention. Here, respondent's micro-organism is the result of human
ingenuity and research." Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313.
64 Chahrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310.
65 Dr. Lin, who holds a Ph.D. in Biochemistry from the University of Illinois, joined
Amgen in 1981 after doing research work on cancer at Purdue University, the University of
Nebraska, Louisiana State University, and the University of South Carolina. Dr. Lin's first
assignment at Amgen was to solve the problem of cloning the gene encoding for erythro-
poietin. Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, Inv. No. 337-TA-281, USITC Pub. 2186, at
133-34.
66 Id. at 142. Transfection refers to the process of introducing isolated DNA se-
quences, which carry the particular genetic message the scientist desires to replicate, into a
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structure of naturally occurring erythropoietin and recombinant er-
ythropoietin is not-significantly different, 67 the processes that take
place within the recombinant host cell are both qualitatively and
quantitatively different from processes occurring in the natural
cell. 68 In the body, erythropoietin is only produced when oxygen
levels in the blood stream fall below the triggering level. The trans-
fected host cell differs in that it spontaneously produces erythropoie-
tin-no oxygen level signal is needed.69 Additionally, the amount of
erythropoietin that can be isolated from human urine is insufficient
for therapeutic treatment, 70 whereas, host cells express erythropoie-
tin in "enormous amounts."' 71 Testimony at the ALJ hearing indi-
cated that not only did the host cell contain a new DNA sequence,
but "the cell is taken over and dominated by the presence of the
introduced gene. The presence of the introduced gene, and its need
to express its genetic information, influences the rest of the cell's
characteristics, such that the cell is a different one than it was
before."'72 Thus Amgen's scientists produced a recombinant mate-
rial that does not occur in nature, but is the result of human inter-
vention, making it patentable subject matter under the Chakrabarty
decision.
The Chakrabarty holding introduced the general concept that.
manipulation of living things can be patentable; however, it does not
protect all discoveries based on recombinant technology from chal-
lenge. For example, recombinant DNA discoveries can be chal-
lenged as obvious applications of already known techniques. 73 In
host cell which will then produce the desired protein. For an explanation of this process,
see supra note 3.
67 Id. at 144. Testimony from both sides indicated that there was no clinically signifi-
cant difference between the structure or effect of urinary erythropoietin versus recombi-
nant erythropoietin. Id. at 144-45.
68 It at 125.
69 Id. at 112. Scientists who testified at the initial determination hearing theorized
that the natural and recombinant host cells differed in that the recombinant gene pos-
sesses a "very open chromatin structure," making it accessible to the transcriptional ma-
chinery, regulatory factors, and polymerases which produce messenger RNA for EPO. Id.
at 126.
70 Id. at 113.
71 Id. at 112.
72 d. at 114.
73 35 U.S.C. § 103 states:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically dis-
closed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in
which the invention was made.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). The scope of section 103 was outlined by the Supreme Court in
Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), in which a patent for plow shock absorbers
was found invalid because the subject matter was obvious to a person having ordinary skill
in the art. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the test of obviousness that
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Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 74 the Supreme Court ap-
plied this obviousness standard to a patent claiming invention of a
laboratory technique which fused spleen cells with cancer cells in or-
der to create a large supply of antibodies that would seek out and
mark specific antigens in patient fluids, facilitating more accurate dis-
ease diagnosis. The district court held Hybritech's claims for this
process to be obvious because of the existence of prior laboratory
techniques which demonstrated ways to prepare similar assays. 75
The Federal Circuit reversed, noting that the prior art could at most
be characterized as "invitations to try monoclonal antibodies" but
did not "suggest how that end might be accomplished." ' 76 The ALJ
in Amgen followed the Hybritech reasoning, finding that Amgen's
claim was not invalid for obviousness, as nowhere in the prior art is
there a description of the EPO gene's structure;77 information that
was available was incorrect; and the nonobviousness was apparent in
light of the failure of other highly qualified scientists to succeed in
isolating the gene encoded for erythropoietin. 78
Chakrabarty and more recent case law thus legitimized Amgen's
claims on host cells and DNA sequences, but the product patents
proved to be useless protection against foreign production of er-
Congress added to the patent law in the 1952 Patent Act. Id. at 2. The Graham Court
reviewed the history of patent law in the United States and concluded that the ultimate
question of patent validity is one of law but section 103 involves a factual inquiry:
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined;
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascer-
tained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved .... Such
secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unresolved
needs, failure of others, etc. might be utilized to give light to the circum-
stances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.
Id. at 17-18.
74 Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 81 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
75 Id. at 84.
76 Id. at 90-91. Specifically, the court found that of the eight articles cited as disclos-
ing prior art, four were actually published after the date of Hybritech's conception of the
idea and the earlier four "discuss production of monoclonal antibodies.., but none dis-
closes sandwich assays." Id. at 91.
77 In order to create rEPO, scientists needed to isolate the natural EPO gene. This
was done by screening genomic DNA libraries (a genomic library contains the repository
of genetic information held in the DNA of a cell). The genomic library screened by Dr. Lin
contained 1,500,000 phage plaques. To screen one and a half million phages for the cor-
rect DNA sequences, Dr. Lin used 30 filters with approximately 50,000 plaques per filter.
After more than two years of effort, Dr. Lin succeeded in isolating and cloning the EPO
gene by narrowing the field from 1.5 million to 40. No researchers before Lin were re-
ported to have used his exact screening technique. Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin,
USITC Pub. 2186, at 140-42. The ALJ stated: "The '008 patent teaches the structure of
the gene encoding for human erythropoietin. Nowhere in the prior art is there a descrip-
tion of this gene's structure." Id. at 54.
78 The ALJ's determination includes a detailed description of the eminent scientists
who had attempted to clone the EPO gene before Dr. Lin and the amount of effort and
funds other companies had put into the search (Biogen alone had committed approxi-
mately six million dollars). Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, USITC Pub. 2186, at
153-60.
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ythropoietin using Amgen's host cell, because Amgen had been un-
able to patent its' process. The patent office's rejection of these
critical process claims is based on its interpretation of the holding in
In re Durden.79 In that case, patent applicants had filed a claim for the
process of making an insecticide. The appellants had summarized
their claim as one for:
A chemical process which (a) employs a novel and unobvious start-
ing material or (b) is for the production of a novel and unobvious
product compound or (c) which employs a novel and unobvious
starting material and also is for the production of a novel and unob-
vious product compound, is patentable, regardless of the extent of
other similarities to prior art processes80
The court of appeals discussed contradictory holdings in previous
cases 8 l and then stated that it would "put an end for now to this
potentially endless debate."'8 2 The Durden court defined process as
"doing something to or with something according to a schema" and
concluded that using an old process with a predictable outcome, but
making use of a new material, does not make the process itself any
less obvious.8 3 The Patent and Trademark Office interprets Durden
to mean that patents cannot be granted on known manipulations or
methods, even though novel starting materials are used, and novel
end products result.8 4 In its examination of Amgen's patent applica-
tion, the PTO rejected the process claims on the basis of the Durden
holding, finding that the extracellular processes were known labora-
tory practices 5 and that the intracellular processes were "nothing
more or less than what happens each and every time a cell grows and
79 In re Durden, 763 F.2d 1406, 226 U.S.P.Q0 (BNA) 359 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
80 Id. at 1406, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 360.
81 The holding in Ex parte MacAdams, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 445 (P.T.O. Bd. App.,
1978), is directly opposite to In re Durden. MacAdams, which dealt with claims involving
molding plastics, held that the specific nature of the material employed in the process
bears upon patentability of the process and if its use is not obvious from the art or creates
unexpected results, the method as a whole must be considered unobvious. Id. at 448. The
Durden court expressly overruled MacAdams and instead followed In re Albertson, 332 F.2d
379, 141 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 730 (C.C.P.A. 1964). In Albertson process claims dealing with a
formula for preparing chemical compounds were rejected as obvious in view of references
showing the same chemical reduction process applied to other materials: "We do not
agree with appellant's proposition that the 'use of an unobvious starting material renders a
process unobvious.' Were this true, every step, for example dissolving or heating, when
performed on a new compound would result in a patentable process." Id. at 382, 141
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 733. The dissenting judge referred to two of his previous dissents in
obviousness cases, lamenting the "shackles with which traditional claim forms had en-
slaved" the patent law's provisions and terming the Albertson decision "the third movement
in the requiem for the 'new use of a known process' provision of 35 U.S.C. § 100(b)." Id.
at 382, 141 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 733.
82 Albertson, 332 F.2d at 382, 141 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 733.
83 In re Durden, 763 F.2d at 1410, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 362.
84 Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, USITC Pub. 2186, at 28. See 5 D. CHsuUM,
PATENTs § 5.04[8] n.47.1 (1991) (using Amgen to illustrate "the potential difficulties that
the apparent holding of Durden can create for obtaining effective patent protection in an
area of technology such as recombinant DNA technology").
85 Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, USITC Pub. 2186, at 130-31.
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expresses a protein." 6 As asserted by the ALJ:. "the only reason
that § 1337a is not applicable to the respondent's importations of
EPO is the policy of the Patent and Trademark Office, because of its
interpretation of In re Durden."87 It was this interpretation by the
PTO that caused Amgen to drop its explicit process claims. If these
claims had instead been allowed, the question of whether or not
Chugai was violating § 1337's prohibition against importing a prod-
uct made abroad by a patented process could never have arisen.8 8
Significance
1. Barriers to Recombinant Technology
The combination of the PTO's rejection of Amgen's process
claims under Durden with the Federal Circuit holding that section
1337 only protects express process claims leaves recombinant DNA
technology with no effective protection against unfair overseas com-
petition. The crucial process involved in recombinant DNA technol-
ogy, production of the required protein, takes place within the cell,
but the International Trade Commission held that "[t]he '008 claims
cannot, as a matter of law, cover these intracellular processes" be-
cause patent law has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to "pre-
clude the grant of a patent on articles or processes of nature."8 9 The
Federal Circuit went further than the ITC, stating that there was no
difference between Amgen's host cell product claims and any other
product claim.90 The court asserted that because Chakrabarty's bac-
teria were analogous to host cells, host cells too were just a "compo-
sition of matter. "9 1 The court did move in the direction of admitting
that a cell might be thought of as a "living 'machine' in the sense that
it performs certain intracellular processes in the course of producing
rEPO,"'9 2 but backed off from admitting that the process was patent-
able by comparing a host cell to "any mechanical machine which per-
forms certain 'intramachinery' processes in the course of producing
86 Id. at 130.
87 Id. at 28.
88 The ALJ stated:
The use of a patented product like that described in the claims of the '008
patent constitutes patent infringement if done in the United States. 35
U.S.C. § 271. Use of the claimed host cell in the United States to make EPO
would be an infringement of the '008 patent.... However, use of a patented
product abroad does not violate 35 U.S.C. § 271.
Id. at 60.
89 In re Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1906, 1910 (Int'l
Trade Comm'n 1989) (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972)); Funk Bros. Seed
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
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whatever the machine is designed to produce."93 The court con-
cluded that a host cell claim cannot cover intracellular processes
"any more or less than a claim to a machine "covers" the process
performed by that machine." 94 This logic ignores the fact that
processes performed by machines are patentable under U.S. stat-
utes95 and would unquestionably be patented by the company in-
volved, whereas, under the Federal Circuit's interpretation of
Chakrabarty, intracellular processes cannot be patented.
The Federal Circuit's reasoning ignores much of the scientific
testimony presented at the initial determination. As Dr. Lin testified,
"[t]he cell is basically a bag of cellular processes." 96 Dr. Sadler testi-
fied that he did not understand Amgen's claims to describe a pro-
cess, 97 but later described the environment within a cell to be "a
dynamic one with many molecules moving from,place to place...
When the recombinant host cell expresses erythropoietin there are
processes going on within the cell."' 98 Dr. Goldwasser testified that a
"vast number" of intracellular processes are performed by host cells
making erythropoietin. Additionally, he stated: "These processes
are integrated into the cell. These processes cannot be separated
from the host cell if the cell is to make a useful quantity of erythro-
poietin." 99 Dr. Wall stated that in order to work properly intracellu-
lar processes must occur within the cell: "The processes which are
separable from the cell are incapable of producing EPO in useful
amounts."' 00 Thus the host cell's value is limited to the process that
it performs.' 0 ' If the process cannot be protected from overseas
competition, nothing of value is protected.
The International Trade Commission insisted on a further hur-
dle-a detailed description of the exact steps involved in the pro-
cess.10 2 This is simply impossible at the present stage of scientific
93 Id. at 1537-38.
94 Id. at 1538.
95 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
96 Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, Inv. No. 337-TA-281, USITC Pub. 2186, at
109. See, Comment, Toward the Right of Commerciality, 34 UCLA L. REV. 207, 209 (1986)
which asserts that human cells are indispensable to the creation and production of bio-
logics. The article points out that "biotechnology allows only the manipulation, not the
creation, of life.... The manifold and subtle intricacies of the cell, which in the aggregate
allow the cell to 'live,' remain undefined and beyond the power of the biotechnologist."
Id. at 209 n.6. Human cells are thus necessary to act as "miniature factories." Id. at 209.
97 Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin,' USITC Pub. 2186, at 121.
98 Id. at 122.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 123.
101 "The claimed host cell has no practical utility other than to make recombinant
erythropoietin." Id. at 175.
102 In re Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1906, 1911 (Int'l
Trade Comm'n 1989) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112). The disclosure requirement serves the
functions of ensuring that after the 17 year patent has expired the public will have full use
of the invention and permits the PTO to determine that the applicant has developed an
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knowledge. Dr. Goldwasser testified that "[s]cientists do not under-
stand very much of the processing of the mRNA to a translatable
message."' 03 He described other intracellular mechanisms as mod-
erately well known and some as not well understood at all. Specifi-
cally, the ongoing processes in the host cell "are not fully
understood, have not been identified, and cannot be fully
described." 0 4
The requirement of a description which enables other practi-
tioners to practice the claimed invention has been modified in other
areas in which the hurdle would be insurmountable. 10 5 In Ex parte
Goeddel the Patent Board held that a deposit of starting materials
from which one of ordinary skill in the art could produce the claimed
product would constitute sufficient disclosure where detailed de-
scription was not possible.' 0 6 On January 1, 1990, the Patent and
Trademark Office amended its rules of practice to include proce-
dures to govern the deposit of biological materials for patent prac-
tices. The new rules prescribe deposit procedures that will satisfy
the description requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112.107 Therefore, a
patent application covering intracellular processes, such as occur in
the production of rEPO, is no longer incompatible with 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, even if the processes are not yet understood or describable.
Basing rejection of Amgen's process claims on Durden can also
be questioned. The patent examiner interpreted the Durden holding
operative, useful invention. See Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Bio-
technology Research, 97 YALE LJ. 177, 207 (1987).
103 Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, USITC Pub. 2186, at 124.
104 Id.
105 Wiseman, Biotechnology Patent Practice-A Primer, 16 AM. INTELL. PROP. L.A. QJ. 394,
400-02 (1989). Wiseman suggests allowing deposits of the microorganism as a substitute
for a full description. He acknowledges that the requirement of disclosure is "particularly
troublesome in the area of biotechnology where the knowledge of cause and effect rela-
tionships is in its infancy when compared to the more traditional chemical sciences." Id. at
401-02. See also Eisenberg, supra note 102, at 207-11 (suggesting that a deposit of the
microorganism should suffice); Lentz, Adequacy of Disclosures of Biotechnology Inventions, 16
AM. IrrELL. PROP. L.A. QJ. 314 (1989) (reviewing the United States practice of deposits
and comparing it with European practices).
106 Ex parte Goeddel, 5. U.S.P.Q02d (BNA) 1449 (P.T.O. Bd. Pat. App. 1985).
107 The final rule was first published on August 22, 1989 (four months after the ITC's
ruling on Amgen's claims). 54 Fed. Reg. 34,880 (1989). The specific regulations are con-
tained in 37 C.F.R. § 1.801-1.809 (1990). Section 1.801 defines biological material as
"material that is capable of self-replication either directly or indirectly .. .including...
eukaryotic cells, cell lines, hybridomas, plasmids... [v]iruses, vectors, cell organelles and
other non-living material existing in and reproducible from a living cell may be deposited
by deposit of the host cell capable of reproducing the non-living material." 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.801 (1990). Section 1.802 allows deposit of such material: "Where an invention is, or
relies on, a biological material, the disclosure may include reference to a deposit of such
biological material." 37 C.F.R. § 1.802 (1990). Sections 1.803 to 1.809 deal with the is-
sues of acceptable depositories, timing, replacement, term, viability, furnishing of samples,
and examination procedures. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.803-1.809 (1990). Also applicable to
Amgen's patent are new regulations codified at §§ 1.821-1.823 which deal with the proper
manner to submit disclosures dealing with nucleotides and/or amino acid sequences. 37
C.F.R. §§ 1.821-1.823 (1990).
PATENTS AND PRODUCTS OF NATURE
as rejecting application of"an old process to new materials."' 0 8 Im-
plicitly, this indicates that the patent examiner regarded the intracel-
lular process as "old." However, scientific testimony shows that the
process which takes place in the host cell is not the same as the pro-
cess in a natural cell. 109 The generalized process of DNA replication
applies to all cells, but the particular process going on inside host
cells differs from that in natural cells which make erythropoietin." 0
The difference is manifested both by the quantitative difference in
cell output (a host cell produces a thousand times more erythropoie-
tin)"' and by the production of erythropoietin in a host cell without
any signal (whereas there must be a trigger for the process to take
place in the natural cell)."l 2 Therefore, while the details of the intra-
cellular processes are not yet known, the results of the cell's activity
provide clear evidence that the processes going on in the host cell
are measurably different from those occurring in the natural cell.
Therefore, the Amgen application did not merely apply "an old pro-
cess to new materials," and the Durden rule was inapplicable to the
case. Similarly, the mandate that natural phenomena are "free to all
men and reserved exclusively to none,"1 1 3 does not apply, as the
host cell activity would not occur without human intervention."14
2. Effect on Congressional Mandate
The International Trade Commission and subsequently the Fed-
eral Circuit focused their decisions on whether or not Amgen pos-
sessed a valid process patent under the current policies of the patent
office. There are two problems with this approach. First, such a fo-
cus gives the patent office indirect control over essentially interna-
tional trade questions. Second, limiting the scope of the Tariff Act to
108 Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, USITC Pub. 2186, at 23.
109 Testimony before the ALJ indicated that the host cell functions differently from
natural cells because it is "totally separate from its original tissue source." Id. at 112.
Regulatory signals are different because it no longer interacts with other cells. The scien-
tists emphasized that, even though Amgen used hamster cells, the basic difference was not
the source of the cells, but the fact that the host cells had been transfected. Id. at 114.
110 Dr. Lin testified that although the "generalized transcription, translation, glycosy-
lation, and secretion processes apply to all cells ...in the recombinant host cells, the
actual processes going on inside the cells are different from those in natural cells which
make EPO." Id. at 145.
'M' Id. at 113.
112 Id. at 112-13.
113 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
114 Chakrabarty clearly distinguishes purely natural phenomena from phenomena oc-
curring only after man's intervention:
His claim is not to a hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but to a non-
naturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter-a product of
human ingenuity .... [Tihe patentee, has produced a new bacterium with
markedly different characteristics from any found in nature and one having
the potential for significant utility. His discovery is not nature's handiwork,
but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject matter under § 101.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980).
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patent violations unduly restricts the original intent of Congress to
protect domestic industries from unfair trade practices.
As the Administrative Law Judge pointed out, the International
Trade Commission limited its investigation to the question of
whether or not Amgen had a patented process that could be pro-
tected." 1 5 The ALJ asserted that such a narrow interpretation of the
scope of protection afforded by the Tariff Act could potentially upset
the balance of power between two governmental agencies and,
thereby, distort Congressional intent. 1 6 He explained that the ap-
plication of Durden to Amgen's patent claims should be viewed
merely as current patent office policy, not black letter law: "Such
policy has been different in the past, and could change again to-
morrow." 11 7 More importantly, Congress did not delegate responsi-
bility for international trade to the patent office. Allowing patent
office decisions to limit the scope of the Tariff Act ignores the under-
lying purpose of section 337, "to protect United States industry from
unfair practices involved in imported goods manufactured abroad."
The Commission and not the PTO is responsible under section 337,
for the protection of American industry from unfair acts and prac-
tices in the importation of goods .... [T]he underlying purpose of
section 337, which is to protect United States industry from unfair
practices involved in imported goods manufactured abroad is ig-
nored. Permitting the decision concerning whether there is an un-
fair act or practice involved in respondents' importations of EPO to
be decided on the PTO's view of In re Durden, is to leave these inter-
national trade questions in the hands of the PTO.118
Fifty-five years earlier, the courts came to a similar decision to
narrowly construe Congressional intent to protect American industry
from unfair trade practices." 9 In In re/lmtorg, the court held that the
importation of foreign products made abroad by a patented process
did not constitute unfair trade practices.' 20 In response to this deci-
sion, Congress amended the Tariff Act of 1930 to specifically state
that products made abroad by means of a process patented in the
United States could not be imported for use, sale, or exchange.' 2 1
The Senate report on this amendment stated: "Since the Amtorg de-
cision owners of American process patent [sic] are helpless to pre-
vent the infringement abroad of their patent rights."1 22 Anticipating
the Congressional reaction to the majority opinion, the dissenting
115 Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, USITC Pub. 2186, at 27.
116 The ALJ explained that the policy had been adopted by the patent office, "an
agency that has no responsibility in the area of international trade." Id. at 29.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 29-30.
119 In re Amtorg Trading Corp., 75 F.2d 826 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 576
(1935).
120 Id. at 834.
121 Pub. L. No. 76-710, 54 Stat. 724, (1940). See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
122 S. REP. No. 1903, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. 4 (1940).
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judge in Amtorg had explained that the intent of the Tariff Act must
have been to protect process as well as product patents: "The rea-
son it is unfair for one to import a patented article protected by an
American patent is because it puts the holder of the American patent
at an unfair disadvantage and destroys the industry Congress was
seeking to preserve, and the same reasons exactly apply to the im-
porter of theproduct of an American process patent."' 23 This reasoning
can easily be applied to Amgen's case. By not allowing Amgen either
to patent the vital process involved in its technology or to be pro-
tected from imports on the grounds of unfair competition, Amgen
has been put at an unfair disadvantage. The dissent in Amtorg rebut-
ted the proposition that if Congress had intended a specific type of
importation to constitute an unfair trade act, it would have specifi-
cally provided for the situation, by quoting a Senate report on inter-
state commerce:
The committee gave careful consideration to the question as to
whether it would attempt to define the many and variable unfair
practices which prevail in commerce and to forbid their continuance
or whether it would, by a general declaration condemning unfair
practices, leave it to the commission to determine what practices
were unfair. It concluded that the latter course would be the better,
for the reason, as stated by one of the representatives of the Illinois
Manufacturers' Association, that there were too many unfair prac-
tices to define, and after writing 20 of them into the law it would be
quite possible to invent others.1 24
Advances in biotechnology have left holders of recombinant DNA
patents just as helpless as the process patent holders that Congress
sought to protect by enacting section 1337. The Amgen decision can
thus be criticized for allowing patent office policy to replace the In-
ternational Trade Commission as the arbiter of what does or does
not constitute unfair acts of trade.
The Tariff Act is not on its face limited to patent violations. Sec-
tion 1337(a)(1)(A) applies to "[u]nfair methods of competition and
unfair acts in the importation of articles ... or in the sale of such...
by the owner, importer, or consignees, the threat or effect of which is
- (i) to destroy or substantially injure an industry in the United
States."1 25 It is only sections (B)(i) and (B)(ii) that explicitly mention
patent infringement. The ALJ suggested that the Commission might
"wish to reinstitute this investigation on a different basis, and deter-
mine whether there are unfair trade practices involved in respon-
dent's importation of EPO, which may fall short of or not involve
123 In re Amtorg Trading Corp., 75 F.2d at 840 (emphasis in original).
124 Id.
125 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(l)(A). Amgen did satisfy the criterion of a domestic industry,
by demonstrating that a plant 24,000 square feet in size was constructed at a cost of ap-
proximately $20 million for rEPO research and manufacture. Certain Recombinant Er-
ythropoietin, Inv. No. 337-TA-281, USITC Pub. 2186, at 63, 69.
1991] 473
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
patent infringement."' 126 By limiting the scope of the Tariff Act to
patent violations, the ITC limits its own authority and in the process
makes the Tariff Act less comprehensive than Congress originally
intended.
The Federal Circuit concluded its decision with the comment
that, if there is a need to alter the understanding of section 1337, it is
a task for Congress and not the courts.' 27 A differing, but equally
authoritative, statement on statutory interpretation was offered in an
earlier patent case. In Chakrabarty the Supreme Court asserted that
"Congress, not the courts, must define the limits of patentability,"
but added (citing Marbury v. Madison) that it is "equally true that once
Congress has spoken it is 'the province and the duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.' ",128 It is within the province of
the courts to interpret section 1337 as applying not only to patent
infringement per se, but also to other unfair methods of competition
or unfair acts in the importation of articles.' 29
Conclusion
Biotechnology research offers a promising path to the diagnosis
and potential cure of many previously untreatable genetic defects
and diseases. However, as government is no longer willing or capa-
ble to provide the vast sums necessary to underwrite this research,
future developments depend on the ability and willingness of private
companies to make the massive investments necessary for biotechno-
logical product research.' 30 It has been estimated that $1.5 to $2
126 Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, USITC Pub. 2186, at 30.
127 Congress did consider an amendment directed specifically to the Amgen case. On
February 6, 1990, H.R. 3957 was introduced in the House by Rep. Boucher to amend Title
35, U.S.C., with respect to patents on certain processes and was referred to the Judiciary
and to the Ways and Means Committees. Bill Seeks Stronger Protection Against Foreign Infringe-
ment of Biotech Patents, 39 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHTJ. (BNA) 262, 279 (Feb. 8, 1990).
On Sept. 25, 1990 hearings were begun on the bill in the Courts Subcommittee. House
Panel Examines Biotech Patent Legislation, 39 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHrJ. (BNA) 462,462
(Sept. 27, 1990). The bill was not enacted during the last session of Congress. On March
13, 1991, Representatives Boucher and Moorhead reintroduced the Biotechnology Patent
Protection Act as H.R. 1417. 137 CONG. REC. E946 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1991). A compan-
ion bill, S. 654 was introduced in the Senate by Senators DeConcini and Hatch. 137
CONG. REC. S3284 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991).
128 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
129 According to commentators, the express purpose of the 1988 changes in the Tariff
Act was to increase the incentive for United States companies to invest in research and
development by enabling United States industries "to protect better their intellectual
property rights from unfair trade acts or unfair methods of competition by foreign import-
ers." Clark, The Future of Patent-Based Investigations Under Section 337 After the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 1149, 1151-52 (1989).
Is0 Amgen estimates that it invested approximately $20 million in building a plant
specifically for the erythropoietin project. Biogen invested approximately six million dol-
lars in its EPO project between 1981 and 1984. Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin,
USITC Pub. 2186, at 63, 66, 154.
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billion was invested by private industry, in biotechnology research
and development in the year 1987 alone.' 3 ' The Supreme Court's
decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty was a major impetus for the com-
mercial development of biotechnology.13 2 Now, however, the Amgen
decision, coming at a time when the dynamism of scientific research
abroad is already threatening to overtake some American industries,
could deal a death blow to domestic biotechnology. If, after spend-
ing $20 million on product development, a company finds that its
patent is worthless because it does not protect the most vital compo-
nent of its research from foreign competition-that there is, in effect,
no protection against foreign removal of the product for production
abroad and subsequent importation-the company will find it eco-
nomically infeasible to continue its efforts. Private funds for bi-
otechnological research will disappear. Congress did not intend for
this to happen. Legislative history indicates that Congress amended
the Tariff Act because it found existing protection under section 337
to be inadequate. The law was amended to make it a more effective
remedy for the protection of United States intellectual property
rights.
In order to promote domestic biotechnology, the courts can
either broaden the acceptable definition of "process" to include al-
tered intracellular processes, or interpret 1337 to encompass any un-
fair trade act involving U.S. patents.' 33 Members of Congress have
affirmed their intent to protect biotechnology.' 3 4 It is now up to the
International Trade Commission and the courts to interpret the laws
in a manner consistent with Congressional intent, thereby facilitating
the future growth of biotechnology in the United States. Congres-
131 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY:
U.S. INVESTMENT IN BIOTECHNOLOGY-SPECIAL REPORT 80 (1988); Eisenberg, Patenting the
Human Genome, 39 EMORY LJ. 721, 737-38 (1990).
132 Comment, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property Rights in the Commer-
cial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REV. 207, 211 n.18 (1986).
133 In Chakrabarty the Supreme Court stated:
The subject-matter provisions of the patent law have been cast in broad
terms to fulfill the constitutional and statutory goal of promoting the Pro-
gress of Science and the useful Arts with all that means for the social and
economic benefits envisioned by Jefferson. Broad general language is not
necessarily ambiguous when congressional objectives require broad terms.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 315.
134 Senator Lautenberg, one of the sponsors of the amendment to the Trade Act,
made the following statement during Senate hearings on section 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii): "The
emerging biotechnology industry has pioneered a revolutionary genetic engineering tech-
nology that produces recombinantly derived materials used to make previously unavailable
products.... Section 337(a)(1) (a reenactment of section 33 7 a) will provide the assistance
necessary for emerging U.S. industries, such as the biotechnology industry, to compete in
a marketplace without interference due to unfair acts of foreign competitors." 134 CONG.
REC. S10,711, 10,713 (1988). Senator Lautenberg was also one of the co-sponsors of a bill
introduced in the Senate to amend Title 35 in order to "provide protection from the ever
increasing foreign infringement of American biotechnology ingenuity." 136 CONG. REC.
S3107 (1990). See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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sional statutes can be made applicable to changing technology if the
courts are willing to interpret statutes in the light of current scientific
capabilities and advances.
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